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Property, Propriety, and Appropriation 
Our comments extend our mutual scholarly interest in the articulation ofdiscourses of property in contemporary capitalist culture and how these
are deployed in the narrative conjuring of capital as “salvific” moral virtue in
global neoliberalism (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001). We are interested in how
narratives of property and propriety, ownership, and entitlement come to be
embodied and performed as moral stories in digital environments (Coombe
and Herman 2000, Coombe and Herman 2001). As Marx argued “capital” is a
“very strange thing, abounding in metaphysical and theological niceties” (Marx
1976[1867]:163). Capital is strange for Marx because it can apparently morph
into so many different forms—as commodity, as debt, as labor, as knowledge,
as brand image, and, underlying these, money as the universal, impersonal
standard of value that makes these commensurable. Yet these strange and
magical qualities of capital rest upon a foundation of metaphysics and theolo-
gy—a particular set of ethical values that construe lifeworlds into monetary
forms and human beings into autonomous individuals. 
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We offer here a small slice of our ongoing work on the rhetorics of intellec-
tual property in the age of digital media and information-based capitalism.1
We use rhetoric in the strong, Nietzschian sense of the term—as the “act of
ordering the chaos of life” (Witson and Poulakis 1993:16). In this reading, rhet-
oric is a social and material practice of the pragmatics of power that punctu-
ates the world with meaning and thereby renders social action possible. To
use Barbara Biesecker’s words, “it is in rhetoric that the social takes place”
(Biesecker 1997:50). Indeed, it is rhetoric that makes the social a place of
meaningful habitation. We do not mean “rhetoric” in the vernacular, pejora-
tive sense as when someone says, “Oh, that’s just mere rhetoric,” thereby con-
noting a fount of frothy words without real consequence (McGuigan 2003:1);
nor do we restrict it to discourse with persuasive force or intent.
One of our favorite moments in teaching is when we ask students to
explain what the word “property” means. Given that the word is a fixture of
our everyday language and speech, students are remarkably perplexed when
this question is posed. Their reticence to give voice to their understanding of
property clearly doesn’t have to do with their lack of knowledge of the word
or the concept. Rather, it is rooted in the seeming obviousness of the answer.
“Property,” one student will venture after an uncomfortably long silence, “is
when I own something.” This rhetorical statement is what legal scholar Jack
Balkin (1998) calls a hegemonic meme in an argument that transports the con-
cept of the meme from evolutionary biology to a critique of legal and politi-
cal ideology. In brief, a meme is an idea or rhetorical construct—a “packet” of
coherent information—that is passed on from generation to generation
through the cultural transmission of communication, imitation, and replica-
tion called memesis (which should not be confused with the anthropological
concept of mimesis). Cultures (Balkin shares none of the anthropologist’s
qualms about using the term as a noun) integrate such memes into quotidi-
an ideologies because of their pragmatic utility in making sense of the world
and allowing human groups to adapt to changing social environments.
Through the memetic process of informational replication, to paraphrase
Balkin, human beings become information made flesh.
We have many reservations about Balkin’s evolutionary theory of ideology.
Aside from the conceptual overlay of evolutionary biology and the language
and tropes of information science and technoculture, there is not much in
what Balkin has to say that hasn’t already been said by Gramsci, Stuart Hall,
Karl Mannheim, Berger and Luckmann, Foucault (especially), and even Marx
himself. But the idea that the social power of ideology resides in its corpore-
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alization, in how it is embodied and performed, and how its makes the world
habitable in the Heideggerian sense as an ethos, is one worthy of further
exploration when the location of this embodiment and performance takes
place on the World Wide Web (the Web).
The problem with ideological memes, whatever their practical efficacy, is
that they become incorrigible—resistant to revision. Property is not simply or
even primarily a relationship between persons and things (as first year law stu-
dents are swiftly taught). It is a social relationship between socially recognized
persons with respect to real and intangible things (and between peoples who
as nations may hold cultural properties) that is authorized and legitimized in
particular cultural contexts. It is also a relationship of profound social power.
The generalized failure to see the social relationships that produce the value of
the things we consider property—the constitutive misrecognition that Marx
referred to as commodity fetishism—is one manifestation of this power.
The cultural determination of property as a social relationship—and the
ambivalences that are embodied in the commodity fetish—are inscribed in the
etymology of the word itself. “Property” is derived from the Latin propius, which
itself has two meanings: 1) that which one owns and 2) a standard of behavior
or correct conduct that is “proper.” The latter meaning of property is linked to
proprietas, which means both propriety as well as the proper signification with
words (Jones 1992:118). The ability to claim something as one’s own is ritually
performed in social interactions which operate to render the owner suitable
and fitting to appropriate that from which he or she claims the right to exclude
others. In the intrinsic alterity of claiming property as a function of propriety,
the non-owner is a person who is not appropriate. In other words, the capacity
to appropriate is contingent on being appropriate (Herman 1999).
The governmentality of property and propriety, although always central to
the logos and ethos of capitalism, has assumed even greater significance in the
age of globalized neoliberalism. Analyses of the scope and dimensions of
globalization and neoliberalism abound, but for our purposes we will invoke
a single statistic that will stand as a metonym for the dimension of the phe-
nomenon we are exploring. Between 1983 and 2003 the value of assets of the
Fortune Global 500 increased by over 300% (Henwood 2003:56). This increase
in value is unprecedented in the history of modern corporate capitalism.
Much of this enhanced value takes the form of intangible, symbolic, or infor-
mational capital that is protected as intellectual property: bits, bauds, and
bytes of ‘digitalia’ that include patented business models, accounting meth-
ods, pharmaceutical formulas, and gene sequences; copyright protected soft-
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ware, imagery, and music; trademarked jingles, logos, advertising slogans and
branding strategies (Coombe 2004, Rifkin 2001). 
At a time when corporations increasingly subcontract out the actual pro-
duction of commodities—whether material production of X-Box gaming con-
soles to Mexico or intellectual production of software code to India—main-
taining control over these intellectual properties is both crucial to profitability
and central to corporate identity. For example, the most important assets that
Nike owns as productive capital are its logo, brand name, and marketing per-
sona (La Feber 2002). The deployment of the brand image as an avatar of the
corporate persona is itself dependent upon the rhetorics of intellectual prop-
erty law that bestow corporate investors with the authority of authorship.
One of the functions of intellectual property law (trademark law especially)
is to construct and enforce particular notions of corporate identity as a prop-
erty right. Intellectual property laws structure a field of semiosis and memesis
and thereby shape forms of symbolic practice and performance (Coombe
1998). They create proprietary rights over intangible assets—the patented for-
mulas, the copyright protected works, and the trademarked signifiers of corpo-
rate self-representations—and thereby create legal rights and obligations to
control their appropriations and interpretations. Through intellectual property
law, symbolic practice is transformed into symbolic capital—a “strange” sort of
alchemy that even Marx couldn’t imagine. 
We can illustrate this by considering the social dimensions of trademark
law. Its rhetorical performance involves signifying activities that connect the
product (assume a computer operating system), the brand name (Windows
XP), the corporate source (Microsoft), and positive feelings in the mind of the
consumer towards these.2 This performance constitutes a closed circuit of
meaning and desire the law understands as ‘goodwill’ (an increasingly impor-
tant form of intangible asset in and of itself within informational capitalism).
This in turn provides the basis for the intellectual property owner’s legal enti-
tlement to fully exploit and appropriate the multi-faceted value of the com-
modity/sign in the market and to manage its social circulation. 
The corporate persona is strengthened through strategic proprietary activ-
ities designed to constrain surplus meaning and prevent the dilution of sym-
bolic value (Coombe and Herman 2001). Unauthorized appropriations of cor-
porate intellectual property and alternative forms of signification that disrupt
this closed circuit must be monitored and, ideally, strictly prohibited. The law
functions as a form of governmentality by enabling corporate owners to man-
age the appropriate use of symbolic capital in mass-mediated commercial cul-
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ture, but they can never wholly control the conversations in which their sym-
bolic signifiers become enmeshed. We will illustrate this here by recounting
one particularly animated dialogue about property and propriety on an inter-
net website and then consider the adequacy of the dominant competing
ethos of digital governance for addressing the issues it poses. 
Whose Commons? Corporations, Consumers, 
and Cultural Others
In early 2001, the Lego Corporation (Lego) launched a new line of building
toys called “Bionicle” in consumer societies. Lego has long been famous for
its line of construction toys. Those of us with young children know how
deeply embedded these have become in their lifeworlds. What is distinctive
about the Bionicle line of toys is that they come with an imaginary lifeworld
of their own—the Island of Mata Nui, home of the Toa, characterized by a
unique cosmology, origin myths, a clan system, tribal alliances and rivalries,
ritual practices of storytelling, and sacred iconography. All of these are capa-
ble of being held as the intellectual properties of Lego if and when they
become associated with the corporation as their source (and given their
extensive publicity, this is more than likely). The Bionicle line of toys (along
with films and internet-based games) has become the most successful prod-
uct in the Lego Corporation’s history.
Soon after Bionicles made their appearance in New Zealand’s toy stores,
Maori lawyers representing indigenous NGOs wrote a letter of complaint to
Lego. Asserting that much of the symbolic universe of Bionicle—from the ori-
gin myths to the names of spiritual powers and leaders— had been appropri-
ated from Maori and other Polynesian cultures, they objected to the fantastic
hybridizations of living cultural traditions and to inappropriate use of reli-
gious and spiritual terms (Holloway 2001). Rather than demand an instant
end to the practice and a recall of the products (like the cease and desist let-
ters that lawyers representing intellectual property owners send when their
protected works are appropriated without consent), Maori groups offered
instead to gather a number of indigenous peoples’ experts to consult with
Lego so as to develop a standard of practices that would enable more appro-
priate use of traditional knowledge in the manufacture and marketing of toys.
Lego sent representatives to New Zealand to meet with the Maori, and they
jointly agreed to develop a code of conduct for toy manufacturers. The corpo-
ration also agreed to stop misappropriating Maori language in the Bionicle toy
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line. At this point, then, Lego appeared to be enhancing corporate goodwill
through its expression of a desire to manage its intellectual properties in a
fashion that went beyond building bonds with consumers. It seemed to affirm
that corporate propriety with respect to cultural forms must also be ground-
ed in social relationships of trust and responsibility. 
Unfortunately, this creative rapprochement between first peoples and a
representative of the digital culture industry never came to fruition; for rea-
sons that are opaque, Lego never carried through on its promises. In response
to this betrayal, a group of web-savvy Maori declared a form of “cyber-war”
(Holloway 2001). They appear to have decided that if they could not compel
the corporation to act with respect towards the integrity of their culture, they
would compel Lego consumers to consider the propriety of the corporate
appropriation of Maori cultural heritage. In short, they intervened to break
the closed circuits binding consumers to the corporation by introducing alter-
native understandings of the meanings of things in Bionicle lifeworlds.
The locus of the Maori “hack attack” was a website called BZ Power run
independently from Lego by Bionicle fans (www.bzpower.com).3 In order to
get consumer attention, Maori activists brought down the site with a series of
sophisticated denial of service (DOS) attacks. This in turn brought retaliation
from BZ Power partisans. They in turn hacked into one of the principal Maori
activist sites (www.aotearoalive.com) and brought down its server. These
attacks and counterattacks precipitated a lively and often angry discussion
between Maori activists and Bionicle fans about the nature of intellectual
property, the propriety of cultural appropriation, the scope of the public
domain, and the constitution of the cultural commons.
The issue of ownership of language and possession of culture is foreground-
ed in the beginning of the debate by “Kataraina” one of the most vocal of the
digital avatars of the Maori community in this contact zone who exclaims:
I am angered and disgusted to see so many Maori words used for noth-
ing other than a kids’ game, pretending to teach others how to pro-
nounce our language, and looking to a Maori dictionary to make up
new names to role-play. What right do you have to abuse our tongue?
Who of you here are actually Maori?
Some of you have said in response to our anger about the use of the
Maori language, such as the so-called “Kanohi Power Webmaster,”
“what gives you the right to use my English language in your post?”
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Permission: your site makes it clear that this is the language to use
communicating here—and everyone is allowed to post. That’s fair
enough isn’t it? If this was a French site and only French were to be used
I would use that. A people have a right to say what they want done with
their heritage. In this particular forum—a mini-culture if you like—the
administration has made certain rules to abide by. Respect would be to
abide by those rules because I am on “your turf” as it were. And I think
how you can understand how that is fair. 
But when you use our culture—you are on our turf. You don’t get to
play with our heritage, culture, and spirituality or even to try to re-inter-
pret and teach falsehoods about it to literally thousands of others with-
out literally thousands of Maori challenging you on that score. Because
we are the authors and creators of that not you or any other non-Maori.
Your rules don’t apply to that which you didn’t author [BZ Power Forum,
Kataraina, 12/05/01].
As the discussion unfolded, members of BZ Power resisted the Maori claim
of collective and situationally specific conceptions and practices of property
and propriety. Although some responses were more sophisticated and articu-
late than others, all rested upon a liberal individualist view of how language
could properly be claimed and used. For many, the moral ground upon which
they built their argument of propriety was simple: as individuals they pos-
sessed the ability to use the Maori language however they wanted “because
the American consitution [sic] says we have the freedom of speech to do so”
(BZ Power Forum, Pickle, 12/07/2001). In a fascinating if unintentional post-
structuralist rhetorical move, other contributors argued that freedom of
speech was itself contingent upon the arbitrariness of the sign. They argued
that the Maoris were trying to claim possession of just “a bunch of words” that
have no particular ground or firm anchoring of meaning and value. According
to one of the more articulate contributors to the debate:
To the non-maori, maori words are just words that hold no intrinsic
value, either positive or negative. Therefore, the decision to use a par-
ticular word or translation is mine. As much as someone else is offend-
ed by what they consider to be improper or demeaning use of any given
word or phrase, I still retain the right to use those words in any context
I desire. This is a fact and it is the founding principle of the country in
which I live. [BZ Power Forum, Binkmeister, 12/07/2001]
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In a similar vein, one member of BZ Power argued that the Maori lan-
guage, like all languages, was the common property and culture of all human-
ity. Any language, be it Spanish, Italian, or the Te Reo of the Maori, “are lan-
guages that any person can use or speak, not personal possessions” (BZ Power
Forum, Bionicle Rex, 12/06/2001).
In a rejoinder to this logic Kataraina argued that from the Maori perspec-
tive, language was not a “personal possession” but “a cultural possession. It is,
in fact, our people’s treasure.” Moreover, she claimed:
Our language is not just about communication, it is about the activity of
life... And given that our whole culture is built into the language, our
spirituality is tied into the words. The language has a design to it that
has many levels according to the context of the conversation so that
words have both a prosaic meaning but also refer to a spiritual princi-
ple. I know it is difficult for outsiders to understand. That, however, is
why our culture is unique. It is not property or product—it is our life. You
are not only abusing our means of communication, but you are trivial-
izing our spirituality. Why not make a Lego Jesus? We are the authors
and keepers of our culture and determine what is good for us, not out-
siders using our cultural and intellectual property for their entertain-
ment [BZ Power Forum, Kataraina, 12/09/2001].
There are many noteworthy aspects to this exchange. It is remarkable how
quickly commentary on the propriety of corporate behavior became expressed
and construed as an attempt to curtail the creative activities of fans which itself
builds corporate goodwill. It is also telling that Kataraina is compelled, ulti-
mately, to express Maori claims in the language of property immediately after
disavowing that Maori hold a proprietary relation to their language and express-
ing the relation as one of safekeeping. It is, perhaps, the failure of the dominant
models of world wide web governance to accommodate any rights of collectiv-
ities, public goods, relations of trust, obligations to others, or respect for any
integrities save for those of corporate personalities or individual creators that
accounts for this. Our means for negotiating proprieties in cyberspace remain
tied to notions of property and freedom more appropriate to a libertarian than
a culturally pluralist public sphere in the digital environment.
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Competing Ecumemes for Governance of the Web 
Intellectual property law territorializes cultural practices in the form of a pro-
prietary ecumene. The word and concept of the ecumene is an old one. In
Classical Greece, it referred to geographical space that was inhabited and civ-
ilized (which, for the Greeks, only meant the Hellenic peninsula itself—every-
one else being a barbarian). In early Christianity and then under Catholicism
it gradually came to refer to the universal Kingdom of God that was cotermi-
nous with members of the faith, wherever they might reside. In both senses,
ecumene referred to a particular place of morally legitimate habitation, a
Heideggerian ethos with distinct boundaries. Those who lived within its
boundaries, whether juridico-political or theological, had meaning, purpose,
and moral value; those outside were marginal and abject. In classical and
contemporary geography, the concept of the ecumene is more descriptive: it
simply means land that is inhabited for a particular purpose. Within anthro-
pology, Ulf Hannerz has deployed the concept of the “global ecumene” in
order to evoke the complex processes of the hybridization and transnational-
ization of “local” cultures in the context of globalization (Hannerz 1992, 1996).
We have found it useful to coin a neologism, combining meme with
ecumene to produce ecumeme. An ecumeme is a rhetorically constituted
“habitat of meaning” (Hannerz 1996), a moral space to use Charles Taylor’s
(1989) term, the territory and boundaries of which are mapped and marked
by particular notions of property and propriety. Two imaginary persons are
the principal inhabitants of the dominant ecumeme of informational capital-
ism (or “the new economy”)—the sovereign corporation and the sovereign
consumer. Other possible inhabitants such as citizens, workers, and cultural
communities are increasingly pushed to the margins and rendered invisible or
irrelevant. This ecumeme is a veritable [Adam] Smithian world characterized
by individuals whose primary social interaction and relations are constituted
by the practice of market exchange. The ecumeme, in other words, is the glob-
al market place of exchange where corporations (legally constituted as indi-
vidual persons) and persons constituted as individuated consumers, give full
reign to the primordial Smithian desire to buy and sell. Intellectual property
law provides the principal rhetorical means by which this territory is invoked. 
The juridical expansion of this ecumeme over the past decade, especially
into digital contexts such as the World Wide Web, has been dramatic and dis-
turbing. In the United States, a series of laws have been enacted such as the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the Anti-Cybersquatting Act, and the Sonny
Bono Copyright Extension Act as well as interpretations of federal trademark
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and patent laws that preserve and expand the entitlement of corporations as
the proper owners of intellectual property. With the increasing transnational-
ization of a neoliberal regime of intellectual property law through the WTO
administered Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
(the TRIPS Agreement), numerous bilateral trade agreements between the
United States and countries hoping to access its significant consumer markets,
and the patent harmonization treaties propounded by World Intellectual
Property Organization, one can well imagine a time when this ecumeme will
become truly catholic in the original Greek sense of being boundless and uni-
versal. This, in any case, is the fear expressed by those who would prefer to
see the world of cultural production in cyberspace constituted differently.
The alternative ecumeme proposed by critical legal scholars in the U.S,
such as Lawrence Lessig in his influential books Code (1999) and The Future of
Ideas (2001) and deployed by digital intellectual property activist organiza-
tions such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the proponents of the
Creative Commons invokes a rhetorical binary between two essentialist
tropes: the “enclosure” on the one hand and the “commons” on the other.
This binary is not a new one. As Karl Polanyi argues in his classic work of his-
torical sociology, The Great Transformation (2001), the enclosure movement of
early modern Britain—through which common lands were increasingly
fenced off from public use and privatized—was one of the foundations for the
emergence of modern capitalism. Those associated with the so-called “Copy
Left” and the Centre for the Public Domain such as James Boyle argue that we
are witnessing a “second enclosure movement” (2003). Today, capital seeks to
fence off not the material landscape as private property, but rather the sym-
bolic landscape of ideas and cultural creativity. The enclosure is thus the
space territorialized by corporate capital where all cultural products and
processes are transformed into fungible properties—commodities to be
bought and sold in the marketplace—whose circulation is governed by the
propriety of the proprietary. 
In opposition to the second coming of the enclosure, these activists (they
have been known to refer to themselves as a priesthood) promote a “com-
mons of the mind” or an “informational commons” (Boyle 2003:41,42) inhab-
ited by cultural creators whose ownership of what they create is strictly
bounded, whose social relationships are characterized by collective sharing,
and whose principal objective is to protect the individual’s freedom of cre-
ative appropriation. The ethos of the informational commons is characterized
by the creative collective effervescence of the sharing of ideas ruled by the
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logic of the non-proprietary—the empirical exemplar here being the free or
open source software (FOSS) movement. 
Although the ecumeme of the commons has considerable political and
emotional appeal, we have reservations about a few of its assumptions. Our
primary critique of this particular articulation of property and propriety is
that it assumes the identity of the ecumeme’s inhabitants and its mode of
governmentality. At one level, it certainly seems like a viable alternative to the
dominant ecumeme: it encourages us to understand the Web as a space
where cultural creators, rather than corporations and consumers, are the
principal actors in a virtuous cycle of exchange that produces an excess of
value that will return to everyone—a vision exemplified in the FOSS move-
ment. It is important to recall, however, that historically the enclosure move-
ment did not merely cut people off from livelihood resources; it also prohib-
ited, disabled, and denied significant cultural practices that embodied and
performed other forms of communication and sociality.
In many ways this digital counterculture is very much like the Romantic
movement (Streeter 2003a, 2003b) that emerged in reaction to capitalist
modernity. They share many significant features—a privileging of the expres-
sive activities of autonomous creators and a quixotic romance of the
medieval, the primitive, and the “indian” as generalized figures of alterity.
Take the potlatch, often invoked in progressive techno-culture discourse as
the Ur-text of the Internet “gift economy” (Barbrook 1998, Werschler-Henry
2001). Through symbolic exchange, the potlatch created relationships of
respect and reciprocity that constituted enduring social ties and affective com-
munity. The ritual also served to establish and maintain social hierarchies of
prestige and power. These social aspects of gift economies are conveniently
ignored when these rituals are so casually evoked. 
Indeed, the ecumeme of the creative commons appears to have more in
common with the deterritorializing practices of global neo-liberal capital than
it does with any of the primitive and aboriginal social rituals it claims as mod-
els. It celebrates informational environments precisely because they generalize
the distinctive disembedding mechanisms of modernity (Giddens 1990). This
enables them to negate the substantive qualities of texts and, as the Maori
example suggested, their place in an ethos lived in practices of community.
The rhetoric of the digital commons also privileges a particular positional-
ity with respect to cultural artifacts. Within this ecumeme we are, first and
foremost, always individuals—independent authors and cultural creators pro-
jected (but never acknowledged) as privileged Americans with indisputable
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First Amendment freedoms (Coombe 2003b). This unfettered individual
appears to adopt the same limited liability, responsibility, and accountability
that his corporate nemesis traditionally assumed. Although these critical par-
tisans have created another ecumeme, they are not in fact “ecumemical.”
Alternative forms of personhood cannot be performed, and substantive com-
munities characterized by social obligation rather than individual freedoms
cannot be countenanced. As the comments by BZ Power fans suggest, because
the individual’s rights of expression by definition trump all others in this
ecumeme, interlocutors who come with other values to engage in dialogue
are pushed into positions that are likened to corporate censorship. This belief
in the creative individual’s own decontextualized disembeddedness is charac-
teristic of an implicit cosmology found in the same fundamentalist faith in the
metaphysics of globalizing flows (Perry 2003:331) held by proponents of
neoliberal globalization.
Ethos and Ecumemes for Digital Futures 
The Maori activist/Bionicle fan dialogue suggests that there are different
responses to the corporate territorialization of the Web which entail different
embodiments and performances of property and propriety in digital contexts.
Rather than simply dividing the world of culture into the ecumemes of the
enclosure and a global cultural commons, we want to suggest that there is
much to be learned—and much to be hopeful about—in the liminal shadow
lands in-between them, a place that is more ecumemical. The point of the
Maori intervention in the symbolic economy of corporate goodwill was not
necessarily to destroy the consuming pleasure of the Bionicle fans, but to
recontextualize the semiotic meaning of the toy-object, reterritorialize the
desire of the consumer, and redirect the memetic practice of the act of con-
sumption. In other words, it sought to conjure a rather different ecumeme for
the performance of cultural ownership and appropriation. 
One of the more intriguing features of this dialogue is the manner in which
it embodied a digital performance of what Mary Louise Pratt (1992) has
famously termed the “contact zone” between cultural worlds of meaning
brought together by the flows and mobilities of globalization. In Pratt’s clas-
sic formulation of the concept, contact zones are “social spaces where dis-
parate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly
asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination—like colonialism,
slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out across the globe today”
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(1992:4). Not only are social relations between cultural frames of reference
previously separated by spatial distance asymmetrical, Pratt notes, they are
also interactive and improvisational. In other words, the contact zone is a per-
formative space for the negotiation of emergent identities. 
In the case of this particular contact zone, the negotiability of identity
revolves around the intertwined dynamics of the property and propriety,
authorship and ownership, embedded in language as a source of collective
self-understanding. The figure of the author performed in both the
ecumemes of the enclosure and the commons is the romantic, autonomous
individual who is the creator of culture and the consumer of its artifacts. One
of the principal features of the contact zone between the Maori cyber-activists
and the BZ Power virtual community of Bionicle fans was the rhetorical strat-
agems through which this romantic notion of authorship was provoked,
invoked, and challenged. 
For Maori activists, there was a profoundly positive moral valence given to
the relationship between authorship and the propriety of ownership.
However, the power of ownership is vested in the Maori community—“the lit-
erally thousands who will challenge” the improper use of their language—not
in individual authors. Those who are not Maori cannot properly claim rights
to the unbridled use of the Maori language; it is the Maori who have created
the language, and it is the Maori who bear responsibility for its use. To the
Maori, the Te Reo language is the very medium of their epistemology and
ontology, their way of knowing and their way of being, which are inextricably
linked. They bear a moral responsibility to future generations to preserve the
indexicality of their language as a matter of cultural survival. 
Kataraina’s intervention also sought to disclose the collective social con-
ventions by which the BZ Power virtual community (a “mini-culture” in her
words) established rules of communication and interaction that governed
their speech. Ownership of property and the sharing of culture is not only
socially produced and recognized, it is also contingent upon the specific rules
of sociality, reciprocity, and respect that are characteristic of a particular cul-
ture’s social space or, to use Kataraina’s term, the norms and values that are
embedded in a particular community’s “turf” upon which visitors are greeted
and embraced. These cannot be established solely by corporate authors, con-
sumers, or individual creators but will require new forms of collectivity and
the negotiation of new forms of digital sociality. 
Maori activists ultimately encouraged the users of BZ Power to consider
their Lego toys not simply as things to be manipulated, commodities to be
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consumed, and fantasy objects around which to build imaginary worlds, but
as a portal to learning about Maori and other Polynesian cultures, the real
faces behind the mask of the commodity fetish Lego had provided them. They
linked BZ Power to a number of sites devoted to the preservation and celebra-
tion of Maori spirituality. The real point of the dialogue was to introduce an
ethics of contingency (Coombe 1998) into cultural circulation. From the Maori
point of view, non-Native peoples should recognize the contingency and pecu-
liarity of their own concepts of property and propriety. 
The abstraction, commodification, and separation of language and cul-
ture from peoples’ social lives and from the active performances through
which we express meaning and value in human communities represents only
a partial, limited, and peculiar way of mapping and inhabiting the world of
digital communications. Partial also are fictions of markets populated only
by corporate authors and consumer citizens, or creative commons populated
only by corporate censors and individual creators. More imaginative
ecumemes with richer visions of sociality and more convivial relations
between them must be envisioned and inhabited as we move forward into
new phases of digital cultural practice.
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ENDNOTES
1This comment is drawn from a larger work provisionally titled Dancing Masks and Toy Wars
on the Web of Virtual Capital: Intellectual Property and Digital Governmentalities.
2There is a case to be made for using the concept of performativity in this context but the
elaboration of the theoretical scaffolding necessary to make it adequate for our purposes is
too extensive for the space allocated here.
3Relations between the cultural industries and the fans of their products are complex and
ambivalent as owners of intellectual property try (not always successfully) to maintain con-
trol over cultural texts of value while diverting the excess symbolic value.
 
